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COORDINATION AND REGULATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT. 
RESPONSE OF THE HEALTH SECTOR TO DISASTERS. THE CASE OF THE 
2017 EARTHQUAKE IN MEXICO CITY 
Jorge Culebro, Benjamín Méndez and Pablo Cruz 
ABSTRACT 
The present article describes and analyzes how Mexico City’s health sector organizations 
managed the crisis caused by an earthquake in 2017. The research question is how the 
city’s health sector coordination and regulation mechanisms affected the way in which 
the crisis was managed. Our analysis assumes that the political and administrative 
infrastructure and characteristics of health care organizations have an effect on crisis 
management. The study method consisted in a case study narrative based on semi-
structured interviews with health sector personnel and a review of public documents and 
formal regulatory instruments such as federal and local laws and internal norms 
concerning the operation of Mexico City’s health sector organizations. We observed 
different types of coordination and regulation associated with different epistemic 
communities, as well as the availability of formal protocols and instruments for crisis 
management, which nevertheless operate in fragmented and complex systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Coordination and regulation have been crucial factors for the effectiveness and functional 
performance of public organizations and also for their capacity to face multiple and 
complex problems, such as the myriad challenges of public health care and the provision 
of welfare (Cassels, 1995). Coordination and regulation have also become essential for 
the provision of health services and social security. 
In general, health care services are usually provided in complex scenarios, which 
sometimes become dynamic, especially when implementing reforms associated with new 
public management (NPM) and post-NPM approaches due to new ways to evaluate 
performance and higher specialization (Bode & Culebro, 2018; Romoren et al., 2011), 
but also when crisis and emergency scenarios present themselves where it is frequently 
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necessary to improvise and override protocols (Wolbers et al., 2018). When facing 
unplanned situations, coordination and regulation systems need to produce immediate and 
accurate responses to manage and resolve emergencies. Thus, coordination and regulation 
problems affect the way in which crises are managed, affecting not only the government’s 
response capacity but also its governance and legitimacy.  For instance, the norms and 
values of different administrative agencies tend to collide into each other due to issues 
associated with institutional identity or differences in incentive schemes (Meyer & 
Hammerscmind, 2006). 
Even though coordination and regulation in emergency circumstances have gained 
importance in the wake of the recent crisis caused by the earthquakes in Mexico City in 
September 2017, few studies have addressed the organizational implications of crises on 
Mexican health systems. The starting point of the present discussion is that health care 
organizations then faced a situation in which their coordination mechanisms and 
normative instruments had to be employed to deal with the crisis despite the fragmented 
nature and particular characteristics of the system. 
The research problem resides largely in investigating how the city’s health sector 
coordination and regulation mechanisms affected the way in which the crisis, as an 
scenario where the government may be compromised, was managed. In some cases, these 
problems can be due to a certain degree of distrust of institutions and negative perceptions 
on the performance of public institutions held by citizens (Askvik et al., 2011). 
Coordination can manifest itself in different ways and give shape to specific types of 
configuration, for example, coordination can establish working practices and affects the 
functioning of the various organizational units within institutions via the formal 
hierarchical structure or through informal relationships (Mintzberg, 1980). Other forms 
of coordination are associated with the traits of inter-organizational relationships (Vlaar 
et al., 2007) or with the functioning of intergovernmental relationships and the so-called 
multi-level government (Painter, 2001). Here, interactions between power and trust play 
critical roles both at the intrapersonal and the structural levels (Bachman, 2001). 
Coordination problems and the adverse situation itself can become more complicated 
during crisis situations, when the crisis takes place simultaneously with the development 
of administrative reformation and institutional change processes, and more so in the 
context of growing specialization and fragmentation that can be observed in the public 
sector (Halligan, 2010). An approach adopted by some governments to face these 
challenges consists in paying attention to organizational culture, public policy cycles, and 
government structure (Verhoest et al., 2007). For its part, the health care sector presents 
a remarkable presence of hybrid and complex systems (Simonet, 2015). 
Coordination can take different forms. The present study understands the concept as a 
series of actions continuously performed by interdependent actors who negotiate their 
decisions to achieve specific common goals (Koop & Lodge, 2014). During crises, this 
concept takes on a special nature in which ambiguity and uncertainty play critical roles, 
although solutions tend to be successful provided that expectations are shared (Wolbers 
et al., 2017). 
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Our interest in this paper is to examine how the coordination among Mexico City health 
care organizations unfolded during the crisis resulting from the September 2017 
earthquake. 
Data sources 
The research method is a case study developed using an explanatory (Harrison, Birks, 
Franklin, & Mills, 2017) and qualitative approach. Field information was obtained from 
six semi-structured interviews administered and recorded in audio at the interviewees’ 
workplaces using data saturation criteria (Saunders, Sim, Kingstone, Baker, et al. 2018). 
Interviewees included doctors, health organization managers, health care infrastructure 
staff, one rescue services manager, and health services users. The interview solicited 
information about the degree of horizontal and vertical coordination during the crisis 
ensuing from the September 2017 earthquake expressed as either protocol compliance or 
improvisation among health sector organizations in Mexico City, as well as the 
effectiveness of the coordination with the federal government. 
Interviewees1 were: 1.- a specialist physician at Dr. Darío Fernández Fierro General 
Hospital, which is a second-level facility of the Institute for Social Security and Services 
for State Workers (ISSSTE), that was damaged during the earthquake; 2.- an engineer 
who led the internal civil protection unit at Federico Gómez Mexican Hospital for 
Children, a third level facility reporting to the federal Health Secretariat; 3.- a doctor at 
ABC Medical Center, a third-level private hospital that provided free care to people 
injured by the earthquake; 4.- an ISSSTE manager who provided a general panorama of 
the crisis; 5.- an administrative employee who of the Mexican Social Security Institute 
(IMSS); 6.- the Executive Director of the Medical Emergency and Rescue Squad 
(ERUM), who provided a broader perspective on how the city faced the crisis; additional 
information was provided by: 7.- a Mexico City health care services user; 8.- staff from 
a university, and 9.- an employee from the local health care services coordinating 
organization. All interviews focused on three different moments: before, during, and after 
the earthquake. 
 
 Crisis and crisis management 
The term crisis refers to an undesirable and unexpected situation that generates short 
phases of uncertainty, conflict, and chaos, all of which, in turn, produce adverse effects 
on the performance of a system that seemed to be operating normally (Boin et al., 2005). 
A crisis can affect a person, a group of people, or an organization, and it must be 
immediately addressed to prevent undesirable consequences. After long periods of 
stability, crises can take place abruptly and at a fast pace, taking administrations by 
surprise and threatening policies and their goals, institutional arrangements, and norms 
and values, exerting a pressure for transformation on the system that makes sound 
decision-making a vital necessity (Boin et al., 2005; Boin, Hart, & Kuipers, 2018; 
Christensen et al., 2016; Matthews, 2012). 
Natural disasters, accidents caused by human activities, armed conflicts, terrorist attacks, 
pandemics, industrial or transportation accidents, and infrastructural failure are all 
examples of situations that produce crises (Boin et al., 2005; Christensen et al., 2016). 
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They usually appear as a result of accumulated vulnerabilities and pressure that eventually 
burst, or they can take the form of an adverse situation under development for which no 
obvious solutions are available. The concept of crisis can also be considered as a 
sociolinguistic construct since it represents a source of power for those who define the 
crisis and make decisions aimed at addressing it (Matthews, 2012). People’s reference 
frameworks, experience, memories, values, and interests determine their perception of 
what a crisis is and construct the concept (Boin et al., 2018). 
Studies of crises considers aspects of different theoretical approaches within the social 
sciences, such as organizational theory, psychology, political science and its international 
relations aspect, business studies, communication studies, and disaster studies, among 
others. This multiperspectival approach results in a combination of different points of 
view, necessary to understand the complexities and dynamics of crises and their 
management (Boin, Hart, & Kuipers, 2018). The present study relies mainly on 
organizational theory and institutional analysis to understand crisis management and its 
impact on critical sectors such as health care. 
Proper management of crises can save lives, protect infrastructure, and restore the 
citizenry’s trust in public institutions (Boin, Kuipers, Overdijk, 2013). This management 
function is one of the fundamental government areas, and the actions derived from risk 
management are crucial in strengthening both the population’s ability to resist and the 
critical infrastructure networks (Baubion, 2012).  
Damage can be limited when policymakers address a crisis adequately, but when they fail 
to do this, the impact tends to increase (Boin et al., 2005). As a result, the approach to 
crisis management must recognize the importance of the role of prevention and risk 
management, although it also accepts that crises can always occur. It leans toward the 
idea of preparing in advance for such eventualities because preparedness can represent 
the difference between a small incident and a major disaster. Crisis management also 
acknowledges the possible emergence of opportunities during extreme situations because 
crises can represent gains for certain actors (Boin, Hart, & Kuipers, 2018). 
Crisis management is often deemed as a series of activities aimed at minimizing the 
impact of any crisis, including different stages: preparation, response, communication, 
and feedback analysis. Instruments intended to assess learning and the degree of structural 
linkage can be designed for each of these stages, and cooperation and coordination are 
crucial to understanding the effectiveness of the activities and the relationships among 
the actors and organizations involved, each of them seeking their own institutional 
interests and following their institutional logics. The implications and impact of this 
approach to management go beyond the different levels of government, and they may 
even affect the legitimacy and governance of public institutions (Ansell, Boin, & Keller 
2010; Boin et al., 2005; Boin, Hart, & Kuipers, 2018; Boin, Kuipers, & Overdijk, 2013; 
Boin & Lodge, 2016; Matthews, 2012). 
 
 Crisis, coordination and management 
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Due to the emotional component inherent to crises, governments and officials deal with 
the unknown as they negotiate with other administrative levels and national and 
international organizations and become involved with various actors and their particular 
agendas. In addition, they face constant social pressure by the media, and citizens are 
often highly demanding in their expectations of transparency, responsibility, and ethical 
standards. Also, authorities and officials see their response capacity reduced by 
decentralization and privatization. As a result, they must adapt their processes, structures, 
tools, and equipment to react immediately to the event or otherwise risk a political 
backlash amid criticism resulting from their ineffectual or inexistent response (Baubion, 
2012). 
Crises are difficult to predict and develop in unexpected ways, which demands 
simultaneous and coordinated actions from different organizations and government actors 
who must cooperate with one another and be able to improvise because established 
operation routines often become inadequate during crisis scenarios (Christensen, 
Laegreid, & Rykkja, 2012). These scenarios represent serious challenges for the officials 
responsible for making public policy, regulatory actors, and administrators for 
establishing adequate administrative structures to facilitate effective responses to crises 
and joint cooperative actions, by diverse actors and different levels of policy, as well as 
flexibility and efficiency to merge stability and organizational preparedness. 
Nevertheless, when these structures are in place, they become the foundations of an 
adequate response to fragmented political and administrative systems (Christensen et al., 
2016). 
Coordination mechanisms work differently during crises, and hierarchical structures or 
networks become an essential aspect of crisis management because crises and their 
implications overlap organizational jurisdictions. Therefore, crisis management require 
constant coordination among individual actors and organizations unable to resolve all of 
the problems caused by the adverse situation working on their own (Christensen et al., 
2016; Boin & Lodge, 2016).  
Two different theoretical streams, as Christensen et al., indicates (2016), can be used to 
understand coordination processes: the structural-instrumental perspective and the 
cultural perspective. These two views are not mutually exclusive. In the first view, 
coordination is vertical and horizontal in terms of hierarchy; the higher the hierarchy, the 
higher the level of authority to coordinate. Horizontally, the structural-instrumental 
approach examines the work carried out by different actors at the same level, generating 
networks of public servants from different areas and levels, as well as networks of 
governmental and non-governmental actors. 
The cultural perspective focuses on the way in which the configuration of informal norms 
and values rooted in political/administrative systems affect decision-making processes, 
provided such values (and other historically acquired and constantly evolving traits) 
provide value, direction, and meaning to the organization’s activities. This vision 
emphasizes a positive public sector culture, public values, and trust relationships because 
these traits explain how actors and decision-makers think and act in a bureaucracy 
(Christensen et al., 2016). 
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Coordination is a key element in the response to any type of crisis and disaster, and it 
takes two forms: intra-organizational or inter-organizational (i.e., horizontal or vertical). 
It pertains to international organizations as well as all government levels. Organizational 
and institutional learning play a central role in the coordination of different structures, 
regions, and levels of government (Christensen et al., 2016; Laegreid & Rykkja, 2016; 
Levitt & March 1988; Herriot et al., 1985). Lessons learned from circumstances before 
and after other crises can help to discover new solutions (Boin, Kuipers, & Overdijk, 
2013); in the case of Mexico, relevant organizational learning can be obtained by 
analyzing the lessons from the previous major earthquake, in 1985. The health sector is 
perhaps one of the areas in which borders are most blurred. Collaboration and 
intermediation in the health sector can take many forms, for example, top-down intra-
organizational professional collaboration, which can also serve as an epistemic bridge 
(Kislov et al. 2016), or as formally or informally established formal or informal horizontal 
inter-organizational mechanisms. Additional variables are the prevalence of hierarchical 
and network arrangements and the accuracy of the coordination’s vision. Therefore, 
coordination takes various forms depending on the institutional capabilities of a country 
(Christensen et al., 2016). This heterogeneity can be especially marked in the health sector 
when it comes to anticipating crises and emergencies (Baekkeskov, 2016). 
 
Coordination and regulation during earthquakes in Mexico City 
The 1985 earthquake. Toward the development of an institutional infrastructure 
Early in the morning on 19 September 1985, an earthquake struck Mexico’s capital city 
with a moment magnitude of 8.0. Between 10 and 15 thousand people were injured, and 
more than 10 thousand lost their lives. Some hospitals were completely destroyed, for 
example, the Mexican General Hospital, Juárez Hospital, Primero de Octubre Hospital, 
and the National Medical Center (Sabido et al., 2014).  
The characteristics and nature of the health care organizations played different roles in 
the different phases of the crisis. Immediately after the earthquake, private services and 
relief units were critical for facing the first consequences. Soon afterward, social security 
organizations took the responsibility of providing services. However, the lack of 
readiness of the city’s public agencies and the lack of basic knowledge of civil protection 
measures among the population were evident. The lack of response by the authorities 
motivated the improvised and solidary intervention of thousands of citizens, who played 
a determinant role in alleviating the crisis; these actions have become an icon of Mexican 
civil society.  
Changes were slow-paced. The federal government issued laws and created agencies that 
were replicated at the state and municipal levels. The General Civil Protection Act was 
issued in 2000 (DOF, 2000) and abrogated in 2012 (DOF, 2012); a new version has been 
amended several times (DOF, 2018a). A National Civil Protection System (SNPC) was 
created in 1986 (López-Levi et al., 2016) using an integrated risk management approach, 
and created conditions for vertical and horizontal coordination among organizations at all 
government levels, volunteer groups, civil society, the private sector, and educational and 
research centers. The SNPC’s Organization Manual was issued in 2018 (DOF, 2018a). 
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The SNPC originated three entities: a) the National Center For Disaster Prevention in 
1988, a technical-scientific organization responsible for the administration and promotion 
of risk mitigation and prevention policies based on monitoring, training, and research; b) 
the National Emergency Committee, intended as a coordination mechanism during crises 
and emergencies; c) the National Council for Civil Protection, which was created in 1990 
as civil protection policy consulting, coordinating, and supervising unit (General Civil 
Protection Act) (DOF, 2018b). National protocols (SEGOB, 2010; DOF, 2015) have also 
been created by health care organizations (IMSS, 2016) and municipal and subnational 
governments, although these protocols are insufficiently known (interviews 6, 7, 8, and 
9). 
Subsequently, the SNPC was also replicated by state and municipal governments. 
Coordination Agreements to obtain the cooperation of local governments were signed. 
Thus, Civil Protection Internal Program commissions, in charge of internal coordination 
during crises emerged in schools and both public and private health care agencies in the 
three tiers of government. In addition, the armed forces created the DN-III-E Plan to 
support the civilian population in different disaster scenarios (DOF, 2018c).  
A seismic alert system connected to speakers and a cellphone app is available in Mexico 
City to alert citizens as early as 40 seconds in advance, depending on the location of the 
epicenter. New regulatory schemes were approved to enforce stricter rules on the type, 
quantities, and quality of the materials used in building construction (Gaceta, 2017a), and 
the availability of staff trained in search and rescue procedures has increased. There are 
different laws (Gaceta, 2014), coordination instruments (Gaceta, 2017b), and training 
programs pertaining the three agencies in charge of emergency response in Mexico City: 
the Fire Department, the Mexican Red Cross, and the ERUM, and the three agencies meet 
periodically. Interviews revealed social learning as a result of the gradual maturation of 
the institutional infrastructure (interviews 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9). 
Despite the efforts to achieve vertical and horizontal coordination, Mexico has been 
characterized by a lack of competent public administration (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2005) and traditionally deficient coordination mechanisms (Aguilar, 2011), which have 
hampered the implementation of the SNPC. After three decades, the different disaster 
response systems have taken few steps toward a civil protection culture and have focused 
mostly on drills. The lack of massive training for the citizenry who provides support in 
crises often results in duplicated functions and obstructs the activities of specialized staff 
(interviews 2, 4, and 6). The potential of this extremely rich cultural trait for facing 
disasters is therefore mostly wasted. 
 
The health system in Mexico City 
The National Health Care System, established by the 1984 General Health Care Act, is 
comprised by federal and subnational public administration agencies and individuals or 
companies from the social and private sectors that provide health care services (DOF, 
1984, article 5). The Mexico City health care system includes administrative units, 
decentralized government agencies and bodies, and individuals or companies from the 
public and private sectors providing health care services (Gaceta, 2017c, article 6). 
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Three federal agencies are responsible for the provision of health care services: a) the 
IMSS, which serves private sector workers; b) the ISSSTE, which serves public sector 
workers; and c) the Health Secretariat (SSA), created for providing medical assistance to 
people who are not affiliated to either the IMSS or the ISSSTE. The program called 
Seguro Popular (Popular Insurance) operates cross-sectionally between the IMSS and the 
ISSSTE. There are also health care agencies created by subnational governments.  
Health care is divided into three levels. The first level includes the Family Medicine 
Units, Health Care Centers, and Family Clinics, providing essential health care services 
for 80% of health problems. The second level consists of the general hospital, as well as 
regional, integral, community, pediatric, and obstetric and maternal and children’s health 
hospitals, besides federal hospitals intended to provide nationwide services. Patients 
referred by the first level for diagnostic, therapeutic, and rehabilitation procedures are 
served by the second level. If necessary, they are admitted for specific surgical or clinical 
treatments. Finally, the third level is a network of highly specialized hospitals prepared 
to deal with more complex, low-prevalence, and high-risk diseases in patients referred by 
the second level. These hospitals are the National Medical Centers, High Specialty 
Medical Units, the National Institutes for Health, and the six High Specialty Regional 
Hospitals. 
The national health care infrastructure is markedly centralized in Mexico City, which is 
also the core of the country’s urban system and home to 8 million inhabitants2 Six federal-
level agencies run hospitals in Mexico City: the SSA, the IMSS, the ISSSTE, the Social 
Security Institute for the Mexican Armed Forces, PEMEX Medical Services, and the 
National System for the Integral Development of the Family. At the local level, the 
Mexico City Health Secretariat operates 211 facilities, 17 specialized clinics, one 
specialty hospital, 12 general hospitals, seven pediatric and maternity hospitals, 10 
pediatric hospitals, two toxicology specialty clinics, and four medical units in prisons, in 
addition to legal medical services and several mobile units. These facilities employ 30 
thousand 863 employees; 2 thousand 426 beds and 106 operating rooms are available, 
and almost 2.5 million outpatient services were provided in 2018 (SSCDMX, 2018). 
 
Coordination and regulation during the 2017 earthquake 
Exactly 32 years after the 1985 earthquake, only a few hours after a commemorative drill, 
another earthquake struck; this time, the estimated magnitude was 7.1, 238 people were 
killed, 1,500 were injured, and 39 buildings collapsed (interviews 6 and 9). Unlike the 
first event, the hospital infrastructure sustained only minor damage, and only three 
buildings had some problems, but their operation never stopped. The most severe damage 
to health sector facilities affected the Mexico City Public Health Services headquarters, 
and alternative command centers were set up to coordinate activities in the 16 health 
jurisdictions of the city’s health system. A red alert to warn hospitals about the possibility 
of a patient surge was activated for hospitals to suspend scheduled surgeries (Ahued-
Ortega, 2018). The damage was limited, among other things, because institutional 
learning processes had taken place. A heritage of institutional infrastructure composed of 
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regulation and coordination instruments was already in place when the second earthquake 
occurred (interviews 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9). 
At the time of the emergency, the city’s health care infrastructure seemed to be saturated 
by the large numbers of injured people who sought attention (interviews 1, 4, and 6); 
however, this is not entirely true because clinics, health care centers, and hospitals are 
permanently saturated or nearly saturated not only in this city, but all over the country, 
due to the combined effect of population growth and the incorporation of millions of new 
users to the “Seguro Popular”, which is a public health care system for the population in 
general, created in 2002, which overwhelms available staff (interviews 1, 7, and 9). Thus, 
the performance of the health care infrastructure was not optimal during the crisis 
(interview 6). 
Coordination and collaboration among the different medical organizations appeared to be 
limited in most cases, far from the type of orchestration expected to be established by 
national regulatory instruments (Wolbers et al., 2018). As a result of insufficient 
adherence to rules and regulations, civil protection operations were conducted separately 
by subnational governments and hospitals according to the health care level provided by 
each one on their own (interviews 4, 6, and 9). The political will of the city’s authorities 
provided important support; the Head of Government aptly appointed his cabinet 
secretaries to coordinate the works in neighborhoods where housing buildings collapsed. 
As a result, civilians and soldiers, rescuers and victims, all collaborated despite that the 
secretaries had no civil protection training (interviews 6 and 9). 
The Civil Protection Internal Program (PIPC) introduced strong regulations for Mexico 
City (CDMX) hospitals. Third level hospitals are required to be certified and to have a 
PIPC in place, prepared by a third party, as well as qualified human capital led by a civil 
protection specialist who becomes acting hospital manager, controls access, cordons off 
the perimeter, and stays in contact with hospital management during emergencies. A PIPC 
includes a schedule for drills, training sessions for staff, visitors and patients’ families, 
and shift rotations in order for qualified personnel to be available 24 hours per day 
throughout the year to take the lead during an emergency. It also includes an atlas of 
surrounding risks and the participation of a certified architect who must review the 
facilities after each crisis (interviews 2 and 3). A number of third level hospitals, both 
public and private, created a hospital council in 2017 on their on their own initiative; their 
representatives meet monthly to review procedures and standardize civil protection 
norms; some of these are the National Institute of Perinatology, the Mexican Hospital for 
Children, and the Siglo XXI National Medical Center (interviews 2, 3, and 6). 
The existence and correct deployment of protocols allowed, for example, the Magdalena 
de las Salinas Traumatology Hospital, an IMSS third level facility, to increase its regular 
service capacity (interview 6). Similarly, some universities, such as UAM-Cuajimalpa 
and the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics, displayed an effective intra-
organizational coordination when the earthquake occurred and during the ensuing phases 
of the crisis, especially in its immediate relationship with the local government (interview 
8). 
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Nevertheless, there was at least one pitfall in the functioning of third level hospitals 
caused by the rifts between government levels. The ERUM, a group that manages an 
average of 300 emergencies per day in Mexico City, lacks direct communication via 
citizens band radio with the hospitals where emergencies are addressed—ERUM staff 
need to call the front desk to refer an injured person. The problem is compounded during 
a crisis due to the excessive number of calls (interviews 4, 6, and 9). During crises, 
communication should be established as one of the exceptional functions. 
By contrast, the first stages of coordination among Mexico City’s agencies were more 
harmonious. The ERUM can contact the Regulating Center of the city’s Health Secretariat 
via the citizen's band radio to coordinate patient referrals to the right hospitals depending 
on the particular case and the availability of specialized staff and hospital beds. However, 
this kind of communication is inexistent at the subnational government level, and even 
hospitals located close to each other are unaware of the availability of medical staff and 
beds of their neighbours. This lack of coordination frequently a limitation for the optimal 
use of available equipment for patient transportation (interviews 6 and 9). These problems 
are even more evident during crises. 
There are also other issues with the service of the ERUM. As a result of the excessive 
demand of services and lack of equipment in hospitals, the patient is admitted 3 or 4 
minutes after the ERUM ambulance arrives at the hospital assigned by the Regulating 
Center, but after that, the ambulance staff cannot move the patient to a stretcher or bed in 
the hospital immediately, so they need to wait, sometimes for several hours, while the 
patient is in radiographic or blood analyses because specialized ERUM ambulances 
cannot leave their stretcher in the hospital, which slows down their work. The ERUM has 
improvised a solution of sending an additional non-specialized ambulance to provide the 
stretcher and wait for the hospital to return it while the specialized ambulance takes care 
of another emergency (interview 6). This situation illustrates how small details can 
obstruct the use of specialized equipment. 
The directors of first and second level medical units are normally also in charge of the 
civil protection brigade, but these directors often lack formal training and are 
overwhelmed by the day-to-day management of the hospital. As a result, attention to civil 
protection activities is marginal or even inexistent if the director in charge is not at the 
hospital. These hospitals have a significantly lower budget and fewer options for high-
level training, although they rarely request to the Center For Disaster Prevention for 
training courses (interviews 2, 3, 5, and 9), and their Civil Protection Internal Programs 
are actually only drafts. Nobody takes the responsibility of following up on basic 
measures regularly: emergency doors are secured by chains or padlocks to prevent theft; 
hallways are often obstructed by stretchers or chairs; emergency documentation and drills 
fail to plan for an overpopulated medical unit; the number of people inside the facilities 
would be unknown in the event of a crisis, and when the hospital establishes a new area, 
existing spaces are simply split, omitting a proper risk assessment Units often lack 
emergency signage and evacuation routes. They also lack risk management specialists, 
so information on civil protection (such as evacuation routes, location of safety areas) 
provided to patients, families, and staff is limited or inexistent. In case of emergency, 
buildings are assessed by friends or family members of the staff (interviews 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 
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and 9). Quite often, the recommendation is to allocate part of the budget to implement a 
true civil protection internal program. 
The lack of resources is the main cause of the coordination problems observed during the 
earthquake in September 2017 and the activities that followed, such as the evacuation of 
patients to the streets. Patients in affected buildings were transferred from some second 
level hospitals three hours after the earthquake, and some were transferred six hours later 
thanks to personal calls made by doctors and other hospital staff, often from private 
vehicles (Wolbers et al., 2018). This situation was problematic since, as stated in the 
theory, immediate reaction is crutial in order to prevent undesirable consequences, in this 
case, in order to prevent negative effects over the citizenry’s health provoked by aspects 
such as injuries or other medical problems. Regular services began to be organized 24 
hours after the beginning of the crisis and they were normalized only 36 hours after the 
seism. Facilities were not assessed until after 48 hours. The worker union hindered 
activities in some hospitals (interviews 1, 7, and 9). 
According to the ERUM, the lack of coordination among hospitals resulted in the 
dissemination of inaccurate information stating that saturation was complete, although 
some hospital units did have available beds (interview 6). This was offset by the 
intervention of private hospitals such as the ABC Medical Center, the Ángeles hospital 
group, and the San Ángel Inn Hospital, which provided free attention to patients during 
the emergency and afterward (interviews 1 and 3). However, coordination in crisis and 
emergency situations is also affected by other factors, such as training, the knowledge 
possessed by health personnel about the hospital infrastructure and their risk prevention 
mindset.  
After the earthquake, initiatives to review, improve, and disseminate emergency protocols 
in a number of national health agency areas were halted, and high-level officials pointed 
out that these activities would be a fruitless effort for the federal administration because 
its six-year period was close to its end, in 15 months (interview 4).  
 
Analysis 
The present article analyzes the way in which Mexico City’s health care sector 
coordinated its different organizations to address emergencies during the crisis caused by 
the earthquake that struck the city in 2017. For this purpose, we examined the experiences 
of health care professionals, people who participated in civil protection activities, and 
health care services users to understand how health authorities managed the crisis.  
Our results reveal the current state of affairs, in terms of organizational coordination and 
regulation, among the city's health care organizations when facing an earthquake-related 
crisis. There is scant literature on this matter despite that the country is characterized by 
its high seismicity. This study might open a research line focused on this city or other 
urban areas that need to manage crises recurrently, and comparative studies could also be 
conducted. 
Among our findings, coordination seemed to be remarkably more problematic when it 
comes to the vertical dimension of the different levels of government. From an 
Jorge Culebro, Benjamín Méndez and Pablo Cruz 
 
 
 International Public Management Review 
 Vol. 19  Iss. 2, 2019 
 www.ipmr.net
  58 
IPMR
instrumental point of view, there is a lack of an adequate level of leadership in the 
agencies or actors of national hierarchy, which results in coordination problems. For its 
part, horizontal coordination is more effective in the specialized health services. This 
situation indicates that actors at the same hierarchical level acted in coordination, but their 
coordination with actors in other levels was inefficient. As a consequence of the lack of 
vertical coordination, health care agencies are perceived as inefficient, and the legitimacy 
of both the local and federal government is adversely affected. 
The underlying problem might well be that the formal regulation instruments have yet to 
be implemented and interiorized by the health care agencies, and their actors, created to 
deal with the management of crises, and that relevant learning derived from previous 
experiences has not yet been achieved. In other words, despite the fact that organizational 
and institutional lessons learned from the first seism has promoted interaction, 
communication, collaboration, and cooperation among private actors and with the public 
sector, this situation was not similar among actors and organizations within the public 
sector. It seems that the public health sector mainly dealt with the crisis not in accordance 
to the lessons learned and regulations stablished after the 1985’s earthquake, but in 
accordance to cultural aspects and operational habits. The presence of laws, cooperation 
agreements, and protocols in all public entities can be attested, but their application is 
minimal, almost only in the form of earthquake drills every half a year. There are no 
permanent educational campaigns, programs to train brigades, and compliance with 
regulations is not surveilled.             
Given that most health organizations tend to conduct their work with professionals within 
a certain type of epistemic community (Haas, 1992), standard routines, norms, and 
procedures become the main regulatory instruments for coordination among agencies, 
and they also improve intra-organizational coordination. That is, standardized skills and 
knowledge, as well as norms, play an important role during emergencies inasmuch as 
they are supported by training, both as a norm institutionalization process within the 
organization or as specialized training by third parties (Mintzberg, 1980), with the 
purpose of creating common expectations. Nevertheless, the analysis of the interviews 
indicates that coordination policies and inter-organizational health services have fallen 
short of expectations and the integration of health care systems needs to develop specific 
traits, such as flexibility and adaptive capacity (Suter et al., 2009), especially during crisis 
and emergency situations. 
Another finding was associated with trust in institutions, and it refers to the need of 
political will among high-rank officials from different organizations in the health care 
sector to establish improved communication mechanisms that can break administrative 
barriers separating equivalent areas throughout the hospitals, especially those near to one 
another. This type of communication would allow for real-time data on the availability of 
beds, operating rooms, ambulances, and medical staff to address emergencies. Permanent 
contact helps to deal with crises in better conditions. Horizontal coordination can be 
improved by replicating initiatives of inter-hospital working groups in which 
representatives can share experiences and the status of their civil protection programs in 
monthly meetings. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Mexico City and its health sector organizations have undergone two crises caused by 
earthquakes, in 1985 and 2017. The present article has shown that third level health care 
agencies have become differentiated and developed coordination mechanisms for facing 
crises, such as protocols and training, whereas first and second level agencies present a 
pattern of rudimentary and improvised operation, oblivious to regulations, where the 
scarce resources are not used optimally. For example, we observed that the coordination 
instruments created after the 1985 earthquake and used by Mexico City’s health care 
organizations have plenty of room for improvement, and agencies maintain old habits and 
routines in which crisis scenarios tend to be forgotten. In other words, the cultural traits 
acquired gradually by health sector agencies prevailed as the first earthquake was 
forgotten and affected the way in which the agencies managed the crisis caused by the 
2017 event. 
A noteworthy element concerning the operation of coordination was the extensive citizen 
support during the emergencies. The role played by the citizenry and the private sector 
was undoubtedly important not only to deal with the crisis, but also to strengthen 
governance as a result of solidarity or due to the implementation of regulatory 
instruments. The historical trajectory and path-dependent trajectories of the 1985 
earthquake showed how interactions between the private and public sectors increase in 
such a way that collaboration and cooperation norms and values were present during the 
crisis and they helped to build communication mechanisms for the different actors. 
This situation allows and encourages citizen participation as a collective social action in 
which society intervenes voluntarily in public affairs associated with common goals 
(Merino, 2010); the promotion of governance is carried out not only during periods of 
crisis, but also in everyday scenarios in which trust-based relationships have been 
established. The implementation of civil protection courses universally, in schools, 
companies, and all types of organizations may help the system to seize the solidarity of 
the Mexican people.  
Similar lessons could be learned from other situations involving disasters or emergencies 
where different actors play different roles, even if they operate within a given institutional 
infrastructure. For the health care sector, the main challenge is to find a balance between 
the certainty provided by bureaucratic procedures and adaptive capacity to face uncertain 
and dynamic conflicts flexibly in a scenario characterized by fragmentation and 
polarization, such as the Mexican health sector is despite the efforts made toward more 
effective integration in an increasingly globalized sector (Bode & Culebro, 2014; 
Culebro, 2017). 
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The present article has presented different lessons learned from the experience of the 
earthquake. These lessons show that coordination among public health care agencies 
creates organizational cognitive schemes that translate into continuous training of 
voluntary hospital staff on different specialized areas, such as evacuation, first aid, search 
and rescue, or communications. 
NOTES 
1 Some interviewees requested that their names remained confidential to be able to 
express themselves freely. 
2 Mexico City is part of the metropolitan area of the Valley of Mexico, comprising areas 
of three subnational governments and home to almost 21 million people (SEDATU, 
CONAPO, INEGI, 2017). 
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